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POINT I
UTAH CASE LAW SUPPORTS PLAINTIFFS CONTENTION THAT FINDERS
AGREEMENTS DO NOT FALL WITHIN THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS..
Plaintiffs Brief cited Palmer v. Whaler, 285 P.2d 8 (Cal 1955) as authority for the
proposition that a finders agreement does not fall within the purview of 25-5-4(5) of the
Utah Code. Defendant's brief bitterly attacked that California case and concluded that "it
now stands as no more than a lifeless relic . . . the case is dead." Brief of Respondants p. 6.
Although this court has not ruled on that precise point, it has ruled on the analagous issue
of whether or not a contract to procure a lease fell within §25-5-4(5) of the Utah Code. The
case of Wooley v. Wycoff, 2 Utah 2d 329 concluded that,
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agreements to be in writing, as there is for a sale, they did not do so. They
announce the policy; we interpret it. For us to interpret the statute that the
words 'purchase or sell' are equivalent to 'rental' is 'inconsistent with the
manifest intent***' expressed by the statute and would amount to extending it
by judicial legislation.
The court's reasoning is analagous to the case at bar. This court should not extend the
clear and unambiguous mandate of the legislature to cover finders agreements.

POINT II
DEFENDANT, AS THE MOVING PARTY, HAS THE BURDEN TO SHOW THAT
THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT.
Defendant's brief assailed the short affidavit of plaintiff Calvin Florence by saying,
"Appellants failed to show any issue of material fact, and the trial court had no choice but
to grant summary judgment to the defendants . . . if appellants failed to submit sufficient
evidence under Rule 56(e) to warrant a trial on the matter, it is not the fault of
Respondants."
Defendant wrongfully assumes that Rule 56(e) places the burden on plaintiff to show that
there is no fact issue. In analyzing an identical statute the Kentucky Supreme Court has
reasoned that,
"The operation is, however, somewhat different where the motions are made
by the opponent of the party with the trial burden. Assume, for example, that
the movant is the defendant who is attacking the merits of plaintiff's claim. On
motion for directed verdict the party resisting the motion, i.e., the plaintiff, has
had to and has presented his evidence, which is then scrutinized by the motion.
On motion for summary judgment by a defendant on the ground that plaintiff
has no valid claim, the defendant, as the moving party, has the burden of
producing evidence, of the necessary certitude which negatives the opposing
party's (plaintiff's) claim. This is true because the burden to show that there is
no genuine issue of material fact rests on the party moving for summary
judgment, whether he or his opponent would at trial have the burden of proof
on the issue concerned; and rests on him whether he is by it required to show the
existence or non-existence of facts." (Emphasis added.) 6 Moore's Federal
Practice par. 56.15[3], p. 2341 (2d ed. 1966)". Barton v. Gas Service Company,
423 S.W. 2d 902 (Ky 1968). See also Adickes v. S. H. Kress & CO., (1970) 398
U.S. 144.
Not only does the moving party have the burden of proof, he has a particularly heavy
burden. In construing an identical statute the Texas Supreme Court has held that,
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judgment in favor of a defendant. In such cases, the question on appeal, as well
as in the trial court, is not whether the summary judgment proof raises fact
issues with reference to the essential elements of a plaintiff's claim or cause of
action, but is whether the summary judgment proof establishes as a matter of
law that there is no genuine issue of fact as to one or more of the essential
elements of the plaintiff's cause of action." Gibbs v. General Motors
Corporation, 450 S.W.2d 827 (Texas 1970).
The foregoing legal analysis is important for it shows that it is the defendant's affidavit
which must be placed under the microscope. The adequacy of plaintiff's affidavit is no issue
until after the moving party's affidavit "establishes as a matter of law that there is no
genuine issue of fact."
Defendant's affidavit failed to meet this burden in any number of instances. For example,
plaintiff's complaint raises the issue of bad faith. A bad faith refusal to sell will not defeat a
claim for a commission by one who has procured a buyer who is ready, willing and able to
buy. Lindsey v. Cranfill, 297 P.2d 1055 (N.M. 1956). Defendant's affidavit did not show as
a matter of law that there was no genuine issue of fact on the question of bad faith.
Since defendant, as moving party, had the burden of proof, it was not necessary for
plaintiff to put in affidavit-evidence on the issue of bad faith. Plaintiff's affidavit was short
only because defendant did not meet his burden on the many issues raised by the pleadings.

CONCLUSION
Utah case law supports the proposition that finders agreements are not barred by the
Statute of Frauds. In any event defendant has failed to show as a matter of law that there is
no genuine issue of fact for the trial court. The lower court's award of summary judgment
on counts I and II of plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint should be reversed. The award
of summary judgment as to Counts III and IV was by stipulation and need not be disturbed.

Respectfully Submitted,
ROBERT J. DeBRY
Attorney for Plaintiffs
and Appellants
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